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Abstract
Several papers compare auctioning heterogeneous assets sequentially
with sequentially selling the right to choose among assets not yet taken.
Typically motivated by auctions of condos for owner occupation, these
papers have assumed that each winning bidder exits, so each successive
auction has less competition. In many heterogeneous-asset-sale situations,
a winning bidder may still be interested in acquiring further assets. We
build a simple model of persistent competition, in which the distribution of
equilibrium revenue from separate sales is shown to be a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution of revenue from selling rights to choose. Per-
sistent competition reveals that a high bidder does not always select his
most preferred asset, and that one asset being slightly more likely to be
a favored asset discontinuously a¤ects equilibrium bidding.
Key words: auction theory; rights-to-choose auctions; revenue com-
parisons; persistent competition; private information
1 Introduction
When a seller seeks to auction similar but distinct assets, it is commonplace in
some settings and predominant in others to sell rights to choose. In such an
auction, each round determines the price at which the high bidder gets to select
from those assets not yet taken. Ashenfelter and Genesoves (1992) exciting
empirical paper on condominium conversion auctions has led to the handful
of theoretical models that contrast rights-to-choose auctions with sequential
auctions focusing primarily on this example. While illustrative, it is in an
important aspect a limiting example. Gale and Hausch (1994), Burguet (2005),
(2007), follow the condo conversion auctions that Ashenfelter and Genesove
studied in assuming that a winning bidder ceases competing in later rounds, so
that the level of competition is steadily decreasing.
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Condo auctions in Miami in recent years have not restricted bidding to those
who intended to occupy a condo won in the auction, and have seen a bidder
win, select a condo they intend to rent out, and continue competing. On many
occasions, especially when several pieces from the estate of an art collector are
being sold, art auctioneers have o¤ered rights to choose, and a winning bidder
choosing an artwork has remained to bid for further rights to choose. Some half-
dozen recent mergers or acquisitions in the US banking industry have received
regulatory approval only subject to a requirement that the newly combined
entity divest a certain number of retail banking locations in key metropolitan
areas where its dominance would otherwise be unacceptable. Our understanding
of the resulting transactions is that they carry negotiation aspects making them
less formal than the usual auction, but in some ways closely resemble right-to-
choose auctions. As the number of branches sold typically is well in excess of the
number of purchasing banks, clearly acquirers of some prime locations persist
to compete for others.1
To illuminate persistent competition in right-to-choose auctions, we model
the polar case: winning a right-to-choose not only leaves all bidders in competi-
tion, but all bidders, including the one now choosing an asset, have undiminished
values (relative to the initial auction round) for any assets still in competition.
A key advantage of this modeling assumption is that a winning bidders
asset choice is open to strategic considerations. A winner who chooses and
then exits obviously selects his asset. A winner who remains to compete for
assets o¤ered later decides whether to select his most-favored asset or to remove
from competition an asset less highly valued by him in order to reduce the
competitiveness in follow-up auctions.
Introducing this strategic dimension also serves to isolate a previously unex-
plored assumption, now found here to be a razors edge case rather than robust.
Prior papers have assumed that the identity of the most-highly-valued asset for
a given bidder is determined equiprobably, making the assets homogenous from
an ex-ante perspective.2 Initially, our model maintains this assumption. Under
ex-ante homogeneity, the symmetric equilibrium bid function is the average of
a bidders values for the assets yet unchosen. In equilibrium, the favored as-
set is always chosen; expected revenue if the assets were sold separately is a
mean-preserving spread of the expected revenue of selling rights to choose.
Both of these results are seen to be idiosyncractic consequences of the ex-
ante homogeneity assumption. Section 4 expands the model by assuming that
each bidder draws the identity of his most-highly-valued asset from a common
distribution that favors a particular asset, below called the usualfavorite. The
1Our limited knowledge of all three examples stems primarily from private correspondence
with participants in these markets; we have no data on the relative frequency of the right-
to-choose format. The bank-branch sales involve a lengthy sequence of phone calls that cor-
respond fairly closely to a series of Alternating Recognition auctions (Harstad and Rothkopf
2000).
2Gale and Hausch (1994), Burguet (2005, 2007) and Goeree, Plott and Wooders (2004)
(this last is primarily an experimental paper) employ this assumption without comment on its
robustness. Though types are drawn without replacement in the experimental study of Eliaz,
O¤erman and Schotter (2008), their assets are ex-ante homogeneous.
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outcome is strikingly di¤erent, and does not converge to the ex-ante-homogenous
outcome as the preference distribution converges to uniform. The equilibrium
bid function is a bidders value of the usual favorite, whether or not the bidder
in question values that asset more highly; equilibrium revenue now matches in
distribution that from selling the assets separately. Most striking: the right to
choose is always used to select the asset which would yield the greatest compe-
tition in the follow-up auction were it still available, even if the bidder selecting
this asset values another asset far more highly, and even if the odds di¤erential
that the chosen asset would yield the greatest competition is arbitrarily small.
To sort out the role of ex-ante homogeneity, section 5 briey discusses a
model in which bidders typically diverge in their tastes. It also nds that the
right to choose is always used to select the asset most likely to draw a higher
rival bid in upcoming rounds. Section 6 discusses extensions, including moving
beyond private values.
2 A Model with Ex-Ante Homogeneity
To focus on the issues just identied, this paper analyzes the two-asset, two-
bidder case. The two assets are labeled U and R, to make the presentation
in section 4 more mnemonic; for now, it may help to think of U as a painting
of an urban scene, R as a painting of a rural scene. In keeping with the
prior literature on rights-to-choose auctions, biddersvalues will be private and
independent (here, this will be seen below not to be a limiting assumption).
Without loss of generality, the bidders will be numbered, and assets labeled, so
that an analyst knows that bidder 1 has a higher value for asset U, U1, than for
asset R, R1, although this convention is not knowledge of bidder 2. Bidder 2s
values, U2 and R2, allow an analyst to distinguish two cases: C, Convergence,
when the bidders concur as to which asset is more valuable (thus, U2 > R2),
and D, Divergence, when their tastes diverge: U2 < R2. Of course, neither
bidder knows whether they are in case C or case D.
As in the prior literature, assume that a bidders private knowledge is com-
pletely characterized by one scalar variable and one binary variable, evading the
major complications of multi-dimensional signaling. Bidder i = 1; 2 privately
observes random signal Xi  Gi on [0; 1], and variable Fi 2 fU;Rg, equiprob-
ably until section 4, to maintain the ex-ante homogeneity assumption of prior
papers. The interpretation is that Fi is is favored asset, the one with the
higher value to him. Then if Fi = U [correspondingly, Fi = R], Ui = Xi
[Ri = Xi]. Valuation specication is completed via a commonly known lower
value function L: [0; 1] ! [0; 1], with L (0) = 0, 0 < L0 (k) < 1 8k 2 [0; 1].
Thus, if Fi = U, is asset values are Ui = Xi, Ri = L (Xi); if Fi = R, is asset
values are Ui = L (Xi), Ri = Xi. The impact of this assumption is to make a
higher-value bidder place a higher premium on obtaining his favored asset than
does a lower-value bidder: X1 > X2 , jU1  R1j > jU2  R2j.3 Recall that
3This assumption is introduced in Burguet (2005), and is more general than the assump-
tions regarding the ratio of (preferred value/less preferred value) in Gale and Hausch (1994),
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bidder i obtaining U [R] at price p earns a prot of Ui   p [Ri   p], regardless
of whether the other asset is obtained.
The baseline auction simply sells the assets in separate auctions, English or
second-price, in either order. Bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their
value in each auction, whether risk-neutral or risk-averse, and expected revenue
is YB = E [min fU1; U2g+min fR1; R2g].
In the rights-to-choose auction, the high bidder in the rst round pays the
second-highest bid, and chooses one of the assets. The remaining asset is then
auctioned o¤ in round two by English or second-price auction, soon enough that
negligible discounting occurs. Again, in round two, bidders have a dominant
strategy to bid their value.
The symmetric equilibrium characterized next is in increasing strategies. Ac-
cordingly, a bidder winning the right to choose obtains no inference on learning
his rivals bid as to his rivals favored asset. Thus, the rivals expected bid for
the remaining asset is una¤ected by which asset is selected.
It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium he selects his favored asset;
under the homogeneity assumption, there will, on average, be just as strong
competition in the following round no matter which asset he chooses.
Proposition 1 For both bidders to bid b (U;R) = (U +R) =2 and choose their
favored asset is an equilibrium.4
Proof. Let bidder 2 bid b, and consider bidder 1 upon observing values
(U1; R1). Note that b is trivially a best response if the auction is not competi-
tive (any undominated bid loses ifX1 < L (X2); if L (X1) > X2, bidder 1 obtains
both assets at the same expected price by bidding b and choosing either asset).
Hence, presume the auction is competitive: X2 > L (X1) and X1 > L (X2), so
that each bidder can outbid the other on his favored asset if it is not also the
others favored asset. Suppose that by bidding b, bidder 1 will either outbid
bidder 2 or will be awarded the right to choose due to a random tie-breaking
mechanism. Temporarily assume (veried below) that bidder 1 chooses asset U.
He pays price p = b (U2; R2), attaining prot U1 (U2 +R2) =2  (U1  R1) =2
in round 1, with equality i¤ the bids are tied, and the strict inequality resulting
from bidder 1 having the higher average value if his bid won outright. In the
remaining round, the two equally likely cases yield as follows. C: both bidders
bid the value of their less-favored asset, bidder 1s prot is max f0; R1  R2g,
positive if his round 1 bid was higher, 0 if he tied. D: bidder 2 bids for his fa-
vored asset and wins, with bidder 1 attaining 0 prot. Under this supposition,
then, bidder 1s prot on both auctions is
U1  (U2 +R2) =2+max f0; R1  R2g =2  (U1  R1) =2+max f0; R1  R2g =2;
with equality i¤ the bids are tied.
Goeree, Plott and Wooders (2004), and Eliaz, O¤erman and Schotter (2008). In sections 4
and 5, this may be a conservative assumption.
4 It is straightforward to adapt the method of proof in Levin and Harstad (1986) to show
that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium in increasing strategies; details are omitted.
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Next, suppose the contrary: that by bidding b, bidder 1 will either be
outbid by bidder 2 or will lose the right to choose due to a random tie-breaking
mechanism. Bidder 1 earns 0 prot in round 1, and bidder 2 chooses his favorite
asset (again a temporary assumption), yielding two equally likely cases. C:
bidder 2 chooses asset U, both bidders bid the value of their less-favored asset,
bidder 1s prot is max f0; R1  R2g. D: bidder 2 chooses asset R, and then
bids against bidder 1 for 1s favored asset; bidder 1 wins at price U2, attaining
prot [U1   L (X2)]. Under the contrary supposition, then, bidder 1s prot on
both auctions is [U1   L (X2)] =2 + max f0; R1  R2g =2.
Subtract bidder 1s prot when he does not get the right to choose from his
prot when he does. If the round 1 bids tied, this di¤erence is (U1  R1) =2  
[U1   L (X2)] =2 = 0, as tied bids require X1 = X2, so he is indi¤erent over the
tie-breaking outcome. If he outbid bidder 2 in round 1, this di¤erence is
U1 (U2 +R2) =2 [U1   L (X2)] =2 > (U1  R1) =2 [U1   L (X2)] =2 > 0; (1)
so bidder 1 prefers to win in exactly those circumstances where bidding b will
win. Finally, if bidder 2 outbid him in round 1, this di¤erence is
U1 (U2 +R2) =2  [U1   L (X2)] =2 < (U1  R1) =2  [U1   L (X2)] =2 < 0 (2)
(both inequalities are reversed because bidder 1 being outbid implies X1 < X2),
so bidder 1 prefers to lose in exactly those circumstances where bidding b will
lose. A corresponding argument yields b as a best response for bidder 2.
It remains to demonstrate that a rights-to-choose winner choosing the fa-
vored asset is optimal. If he does so, his expected payo¤ is
X1   X2 + L (X2)
2
+
1
2
[L (X1)  L (X2)] ;
as he only wins the followup auction in case C. If he instead chooses his less-
favored asset, his expected payo¤ reects winning for sure in the followup auc-
tion:
L (X1)  X2 + L (X2)
2
+
1
2
[X1   L (X2)] + 1
2
[X1  X2] ;
nonetheless, this expected payo¤ is lower when the auction is competitive.
3 Revenue Comparison
Expected revenue summed over the two rounds of the right-to-choose auction is
calculated as follows. Round 1 expected revenue is
EY1 = E [min f(X1 + L (X1)) =2; (X2 + L (X2)) =2g] :
In case C round 2 expected revenue is
EY C2 = E [min fL (X1) ; L (X2)g] :
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Case DCase C
{U2 }{R2 }
{R1 }R1
Avg2Avg2
Avg1Avg1
R2{U2}
U1U1
Figure 1: Revenue Comparison
Let w 2 f1; 2g denote the round 1 winner, and :w the loser. Then in case D,
the round 1 loser is bidding for his favored asset, and expected revenue is
EY D2 = E [min fX:w; L (Xw)g] :
Combining, right-to-choose expected revenue is
EY = E

min

X1 + L (X1)
2
;
X2 + L (X2)
2

+
E [min fL (X1) ; L (X2)g]
2
+
E [min fX:w; L (Xw)g]
2
:
It is straightforward to see that expected revenue from separate auctions is
EYB = E [min fU1; U2g+min fR1; R2g]
= E [min fX1; X2g+min fL (X1) ; L (X2)g] =2
+E [min fX1; L (X2)g+min fL (X1) ; X2g] =2:
Thus, YB is a mean-preserving spread of Y . To avoid over-involvement in no-
tation, consider without loss of generality the case where the bidder winning
the right to choose is labeled bidder 1, and his favored asset continues to be U.
Then the expected revenue comparison follows the illustration in Figure 1.
Variables shown higher in the gure represent higher expected values (per
the labeling). Right-to-choose revenue Y is half the sum of the four values
shown in bold italic text. Separate auction revenue YB is half the sum of the
four values shown in brackets. So the expected average value of the right-to-
choose loser appears in the right-to-choose revenue (twice, once in each case),
but is replaced in the separate revenue, in case C by that bidders higher value
and in case D by that bidders lower value. Hence, a risk-neutral seller is
indi¤erent between auctioning the assets separately or auctioning the right to
choose, while a risk-averse seller prefers the latter.
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4 Ex-Ante Di¤erentiation: A Usual Favorite
Now consider a modication: each bidder is type U with probability  > 1=2,
and type R with probability 1   . That is, asset U is usually a bidders
favored asset, R rarely a bidders favored asset. To illustrate bidding in
this more complex environment, assume the distribution G of biddersvalues is
uniform on [0,1].
Now it is essential to consider bidding behavior separately for each type, as
cases C and D have di¤erent probabilities and potentially di¤erent analyses for
bidder types U and R.
Comparable to the analysis of the equiprobable situation, an equilibrium is
sought in which a bidder of type f = U;R employs a bid function of the form
bf (X) = wfX + (1  wf )L (X), wf 2 [0; 1], a type-specic weighted average.
We will nd that no equilibrium exists in which both types use the same
weights. Hence, it is possible that p (the price-setting bid in the auction for
the right to choose) is more likely to have been submitted by one type of rival
than by the other. Before selecting an asset, the winner rationally updates the
probability that his rival is type U, from the ex-ante  to
b (p) = g b 1U (p)
g

b 1U (p)

+ (1  ) g b 1R (p) : (3)
This will enter the winners asset selection decisions below.
It is straightforward that a type f = U bidder winning the right to choose
selects his favored asset, U: competition would likely be stronger were he to
select R,5 and his current-round payo¤ would be lower.
Initially suppose that a type f = R bidder also selects his favored asset,
R, in an equilibrium. Carefully following the steps in Proposition 1 that lead
up to inequalities (1) and (2), but separately for the two types, and keeping
track of the probabilities , 1    and b (p), leads to best response functions
wU (wR) and wR (wU ) that do not intersect. Hence, this initial supposition is
inconsistent with an equilibrium of this form.
Instead suppose, then, that a type f = R bidder selects his less-favored asset,
U, in an equilibrium (bU ; bR). The above cases of convergence and divergence
now require type-specic calculations, for cases UC, when he is type U and
types converge, UD, when he is type U and types diverge, and RC and RD,
correspondingly. Conditional on a bidder drawing the indicated type, UC and
RD have probability b (p), UD and RC probability [1  b (p)].
To nd such an equilibrium, as above, assume that the auction is competitive
(it is straightforward that the equilibrium behavior remains a best response if
it is not). Initially consider bidder 1 when he is of type U, and wU 2 (0; 1). If
he wins the right to choose, and selects U, his payo¤ is
X1   f [wUX2 + (1  wU )L (X2)] + (1  ) [wRX2 + (1  wR)L (X2)]g
+b (p)max f0; L (X1)  L (X2)g ;
5We will show below that b (p)   > 1=2 8p 2 (0; 1) :
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where the subtracted term is the price of the right to choose, and the last term
the expected payo¤ in the second auction, where competitiveness implies he is
necessarily outbid in case UD, which has probability [1  b (p)]. If he loses the
right to choose, his payo¤ is
max f0; L (X1)  L (X2)g ;
as his rival selects asset U no matter what his type. Since this is smaller (equal
only in the zero-probability event of a tie for right-to-choose) for any wU 2
(0; 1),6 bidder 1 of type U improves his payo¤ by increasing wU . Hence, an
equilibrium requires wU = 1; that is, a bidder favoring the same asset usually
favored bids his entire value of that asset for the right to choose, even if the
chances that his rival favors the same asset only slightly exceed 1=2.
Now consider bidder 1 when he is of type R, and wR 2 (0; 1). If he wins the
right to choose, and selects U (as the sought equilibrium requires), his payo¤ is
L (X1)  fX2 + (1  ) [wRX2 + (1  wR)L (X2)]g
+b (p) [X1   L (X2)] + [1  b (p)]max f0; L (X1)  L (X2)g ;
where the case RD (probability b (p)) has him bidding in the second round for
his favored asset against a rival whose favorite asset has already been taken. If
he loses the right to choose, his payo¤ is
 [X1   L (X2)] + (1  )max f0; L (X1)  L (X2)g ;
as his rival selects asset U no matter what his type.
Next consider type Rs choice between bidding weights wR and w0R = wR=2.
With some probability, both bids win or both lose. However, in the event
that the bidding weight choice wR wins and w0R loses, the price in f g above
necessarily exceeds L (X1), so bidder 1 of type R prefers to lose.7 Consequently,
only wR = 0 can be an equilibrium. As it is straightforward to show that bidder
1 of type R cannot gain by selecting asset R when (wU ; wR) = (1; 0), this is
then the only weighted-average equilibrium.8
The type of bidder whose favored asset is favored more often, however
slightly, bids the full value of his favored asset, while the other type of bidder
bids no more than the value of his less-favored asset. As the more frequently fa-
vored asset is selected whether it is the winning bidders favored asset or not, the
distribution of revenue is necessarily una¤ected by switching between separate
auctions and selling rights to choose.
6This relies on b (p)  .
7At this point, as wU = 1, b (p) = g (p) =ng (p) + (1  ) g hb 1R (p)io. In the relevant
event p  L (1) (and for somewhat higher p), g (p) = g
h
b 1R (p)
i
, so b (p) = .
8Thus, if  2 (0; 1=2), correspondingly, both types bid their value Ri of the rare asset, and
select it if the right to choose is won.
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5 Ex-Ante Homogeneity without Equiprobabil-
ity
Briey consider a model (more articial?) in which an analyst cannot nd an
ex-ante favorite, but instead of equiprobability, the chances that bidders diverge
in their preference over assets exceeds one half. This can be done by adjusting
the previous sections model to assume that bidder 1 is type U with probability
 > 1=2, while bidder 2 is type R with probability . Thus, the ex-ante expected
highest value of either asset is the same, but the probability that the two bidders
favor di¤erent assets is 2 + (1  )2 > 1=2.
This model can be shown to have no equilibrium in undominated strategies
which exhibits all types selecting their favored asset if winning the right to
choose. An equilibrium exists in which all types select the asset most likely to be
favored by the other bidder (1 selects R, 2 selects U). Thus, in equilibrium, type
U [R] of bidder 1 [2] selects asset R [U], despite favoring the other asset. This
equilibrium yields less straightforward characterization: type R [U] of bidder
1 (2] bids X + (1  )L (X) for the right to choose; type U [R] of bidder 1
(2] has a nonlinear bid function for the right to choose that is bounded below
by (1  )X + L (X) and above by [X + L (X)] =2, and depends both on the
underlying distributions of signals and the specic form of the L function. The
details are cumbersome, unilluminating, and omitted.
Note that, unlike the usual-favorite model, here a bidder planning to choose
his favorite asset (1R or 2U) does not bid the full value of that asset. There,
such a bidder knew that his favorite asset would be selected no matter which
bidder won. Here, the rival bidder will select the other asset, so the right to
choose is less valuable. Aggressive bidding comes from types not planning on
selecting their favorite asset, but who know that their rival will select it. This
model also becomes the section 2 model as  ! 1=2; interestingly, bids and
revenue converge to that model, but asset selection does not.
6 Remarks on Extensions
Only notational complexity is a¤ected by considerable weakening of value and
distributional assumptions in the initial model. A distribution   of (X1; X2)
can be asymmetric and a¢ liated; a bidder can value his favored asset at
V = !X1 + (1  !)X2, for ! 2 [1=2; 1] : (4)
Hence, the equilibrium bidding, asset choice and revenue can be extended (via
virtually identical proofs) to the general a¢ liated-values auction model of Mil-
grom and Weber (1982), and thus to common-value and a¢ liated-private-values
auctions as special cases.
The models of sections 4 and 5 face dramatically added complexity if bidders
value estimates are not i.i.d. Given independent information, the results can
readily be extended to the value function V in (4), and thus to a¢ liated-values
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environments. A constraint limiting
h
supx2[0;1] g (x)  infx2[0;1] g (x)
i
relative
to (   1=2) would extend the results to distributions di¤ering somewhat from
the uniform.
Natural correspondents to the bid functions above would extend all results
to risk-averse bidders, maintaining asset selections and presumably reducing
revenue. In the initial model, a risk-averse seller might prefer sequential sales.
Selling more than two assets would add cumbersome but manageable com-
plications, and presumably little insight (the second round of bidding, for the
right to choose any asset but that chosen rst, may well reveal both bidders
favoritism ranking across assets). Going beyond two bidders is notably prob-
lematic, as the expected competitionbetween the second-highest bidder for the
right to choose, and highest rival bid by a rival whose tastes diverge with the
winnercomplicate asset choice, and thereby initial bidding, considerably.
7 Conclusion
This analysis has extended right-to-choose auctions in two important directions
with respect to the inherited literature. First, removing the single-unit-demand
constraint on bidders lets competition in rights-to-choose auctions persist and
obtains revenue equivalence across auction formats. Second, weakening prior
papersassumption of ex-ante asset homogeneity allows for the possibility that
a high bidder optimally selects the asset which will reduce competitiveness in
follow-up rounds over his highest-valued asset. This selection occurs in equilib-
rium with probability approaching 1=2 (in section 4). Critically, the equilibrium
bid function in the more realistic case of ex-ante asset heterogeneity does not
converge to the equilibrium bid function for the ex-ante homogeneous case as
the degree of heterogeneity vanishes.
The discontinuity found above has a natural interpretation. The equilibria
in sections 4 and 2 indicate that choosing the asset which would have led to the
highest expected competitive bid in the next round (were it still available) is
lexicographically more important than choosing the highest-valued asset. Since
all bidders agree as to which asset to remove to minimize follow-up competition,
it is known in advance which asset will be chosen rst, and hence each bidder
bids his value of that asset. However, in the razors-edge case when favored
assets are equiprobable, this lexicographically more important consideration is
unavailable, and with it, certainty over which asset will be chosen rst is un-
available. So each bidder reverts to the lexicographically secondary criterion,
which is to bid the average value of assets currently available. Thus, choos-
ing the highest-valued asset is trivial if not remaining in competition, but of
secondary importance if the choosers competition will persist.
The model considered briey in section 5 shows some robustness of the
greater importance of removing the asset which is expected to yield the greatest
competition; in that model the favored asset is selected less than half the time.
Many markets where rights-to-choose auctions are used probably t poorly
to either the prior models or the polar opposite model here: neither is no further
10
competition by a winning bidder guaranteed, nor is persisting competition with
each winning bidder still bidding as strongly as if he had not won.9 These inter-
mediate cases deserve analysis; this paper strikingly points to the importance
of not limiting that analysis to the ex-ante-homogeneous case.
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